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 2 
Abstract 3 
 4 
Background. - Concern about health misinformation is longstanding, especially on the Internet.  5 
Methods. - Using agent-based models, we considered the effects of such misinformation on a 6 
norovirus outbreak, and some methods for countering the possible impacts of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 7 
health advice.  The work explicitly models spread of physical disease and information (both online 8 
and offline) as two separate but interacting processes.  The models have multiple stochastic 9 
elements; repeat model runs were made to identify parameter values that most consistently 10 
produced the desired target baseline scenario.   Next, parameters were found that most consistently 11 
led to a scenario when outbreak severity was clearly made worse by circulating poor quality disease 12 
prevention advice.  Strategies to counter ‘fake’ health news were tested.  Results. - Reducing bad 13 
advice to 30% of total information or making at least 30% of people fully resistant to believing in and 14 
sharing bad health advice were effective thresholds to counteract the negative impacts of bad 15 
advice during a norovirus outbreak.  Conclusion. - How feasible it is to achieve these targets within 16 
communication networks (online and offline) should be explored. 17 
 18 
 19 
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 22 
Un modèle basé sur les agents sur les effets de information fallacieuse 23 
sur une épidémie de norovirus 24 
 25 
Position du problème. - La désinformation sur la santé est une préoccupation de longue date, en 26 
particulier sur Internet. Méthodes. - À l’aide de modèles à base d’agents, nous avons examiné les 27 
effets de telles informations erronées sur une épidémie de norovirus, ainsi que certaines méthodes 28 
permettant de contrer les effets possibles de «bons» et de «mauvais» conseils en matière de santé. 29 
Le travail modélise explicitement la propagation de la maladie physique et des informations (en ligne 30 
et hors ligne) comme deux processus distincts mais en interaction. Les modèles comportent 31 
plusieurs éléments stochastiques; Des répétitions de modèles ont été effectuées pour identifier les 32 
valeurs de paramètre qui produisaient le plus systématiquement le scénario de base cible souhaité. 33 
Ensuite, il a été trouvé des paramètres qui conduisaient systématiquement à un scénario dans lequel 34 
la gravité des épidémies était clairement aggravée par la diffusion de conseils de prévention de 35 
maladies de qualité médiocre. Des stratégies pour contrer les «fausses» nouvelles sur la santé ont 36 
été testées.  Résultats.- Réduire les mauvais conseils à 30% du total des informations ou rendre au 37 
moins 30% des personnes totalement réticentes à croire en des mauvais conseils sur la santé et à les 38 
partager est un seuil efficace pour contrecarrer les effets négatifs d'un mauvais conseil lors d'une 39 
éclosion de norovirus. Conclusion. - La possibilité d'atteindre ces objectifs dans les réseaux de 40 
communication (en ligne et hors ligne) doit être explorée. 41 
  42 
Mots Clés : Modèles à base d'agents, épidémie, norovirus, infox, bulles de filtres 43 
 44 
  45 
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1. INTRODUCTION 46 
Political campaigns in 2016 sparked interest in ‘fake news’, a term with no fixed definition 47 
[1]. At its most pernicious, it can mean mostly or entirely false information, often deliberately false 48 
or at least created with no regard for truth, yet purporting to be entirely truthful, and therefore 49 
indisputably unhelpful when trying to make informed decisions [2, 3].  Worry that fake news might 50 
be used to distort political processes or manipulate financial markets is well-established [3-6]. 51 
Less studied is the possibility that misinformation spread could harm human health, 52 
especially during a disease outbreak.  Accurate information spreading during epidemics that 53 
generates more protective behaviour, as well as other potential behaviour responses (usually 54 
beneficial) following increased awareness of disease prevalence have been widely modelled, 55 
reporting typically on how disease dynamics might change as a result (usually resulting in 56 
improvements to human health outcomes).  But fewer if any studies have tried to model behaviour 57 
response that might affect human health during an outbreak that is linked to dangerously wrong 58 
information [7]. 59 
We built models that capture the impacts in response to spread of dangerously misleading 60 
information, which we simply call bad advice.  The premise of the modelling is that some types of 61 
information about a disease or outbreak (“bad advice”), if truly believed, would lead to people 62 
taking fewer or less effective protective measures.  Examples of riskier behaviour would be 63 
increased physical contact, less hand-washing, less disinfection, or more indirect physical contact 64 
such as sharing food or with contaminated fomites.  We were interested in gastro-intestinal 65 
illnesses, which are rarely considered in individual-based models for infectious disease [8].  66 
Norovirus is the most common GI bug worldwide [9] including in the UK [10].  It can overwhelm 67 
health services [11-15].  For modelling purposes, norovirus is convenient because of short duration, 68 
familiarity unlikely to cause flight response, and very rare death.  This modelling suited the 69 
environment of an agent-based model (ABM) that simulated physical contact that could transmit 70 
disease alongside information sharing that did not require physical contact.   71 
 72 
 73 
2. METHODS 74 
 75 
2.1 Overview 76 
 77 
The model imagined a strain of norovirus for which there was no prior immunity.  We 78 
incorporated observed parameters where possible, and for UK if required to be very specific.  79 
Otherwise, parameters and assumptions were adjusted empirically to yield desirable performance 80 
metrics, as described below.  The key behaviour response was taking effective precautions (TP).  TP 81 
3 | P a g e  
 
does not mean a specific single behaviour (such as reducing contact, not sharing food, washing 82 
hands, disinfection, etc.).  Rather, TP is meant to be an umbrella term (expressed numerically as a 83 
percentage) that includes all behaviours that could effectively prevent disease acquisition or 84 
transmission.  TP describes behaviour when contact could be made with someone with active known 85 
disease; we don’t consider precautionary behaviour in absence of circulating disease. 86 
The modelling stages are shown in Fig. 1. First, we designed a stage 1 scenario for a disease 87 
outbreak, where disease acquisition was partly dependent on individual precautionary behaviour 88 
that was static and unchanging in stage 1.  A mean TP value was found that reliably yielded our 89 
target r0 after many iterations (required due to the random-probabilistic design of models).  The 90 
next stage (2) model had multiple social network and information sharing attributes parameterised 91 
by real world observations and established theories.  In stage 2, a 40% increase in the r0 value was 92 
achieved (compared to stage 1), creating a scenario where circulating bad information led to greater 93 
person to person spread.  Stage 3 considers two intervention strategies to counter the impacts of 94 
‘fake news’ on health protection behaviour.  Additional items S1 and S2 provide further details about 95 
model construction.   At least 100 simulations ran to test parameter values in each stage model.  The 96 
key outbreak measures reported were: r0, overall attack rate, peak prevalence and outbreak 97 
duration.   98 
 99 
2.2 Stage 1: SEIR Model without information spread that changes behaviour 100 
 101 
We wrote a susceptible-exposed-infected-recovered (SEIR) model in Netlogo [16]. The world 102 
shape was a torus (eg. going off the bottom means re-entry at the top), with visible area measuring 103 
88x90 patches that agents can move around on.  Initial agent location on the grid was quasi-random.  104 
The model has universal 8-hour duration night-time periods when all movement stops and new 105 
contacts do not occur. Night-time was explicitly modelled because norovirus has a relatively short 106 
incubation period and duration of illness; both about 36 hours [9, 17-19].   107 
Disease incubation periods and recovery-times were assigned individually to each agent 108 
from a random-normal distribution.  Both attributes had target mean = 36 hours but with additional 109 
desired features for the distribution of their values, as shown in Table 1, to conform with data 110 
reported in relevant literature.  Agents were assumed to only be infectious to others during active 111 
illness.  The model was initialised with many agent-own attributes (Table 1).   112 
Agents were spatially distributed in small clusters with a like-minded attitude (the reject-est 113 
attitudinal trait, as described below).  These clusters often spatially overlapped.  Empirically, we 114 
found that 1600 agents achieved the target mean contact rate expected for the UK (11.74/day [20]) 115 
in non-outbreak conditions.  Time steps were hours; the model starts at 7am on the first morning.  A 116 
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start-time was important to set sleep periods (when new contacts paused but infection and 117 
incubation would continue).  Agents return ‘home’ every evening at 11pm.  Each well agent moved 118 
in a random direction one step in the agent-world each hour; ill agents moved 0.2 steps.  The agent 119 
world space is not to scale with the real world.  Rather, each movement represents time-space; 120 
opportunities for potential new contacts due to travel (by any means).  2% of (randomly selected 121 
and located) agents were infected at the start of each simulation. 122 
The baseline mode had a mean basic target reproduction number from community 123 
outbreaks (r0) =1.9; [21].  In real life, whether disease is contracted can depend on three factors: 124 
separate probabilities of either susceptible or infectious person taking adequate precautions, as well 125 
as the amount of shed virus.  In reality, these components are hard to observe or separate.  Model 126 
infection risk could be captured in a single global infection-chance parameter, but in our model, risk-127 
taking behaviour of susceptible and infectious persons had to be distinct, so that the likelihood of 128 
unsafe behaviour could vary individually and over time.  Each agent needed a  “take precautions” 129 
(TP) property, to represent the probability of taking effective precautions to avoid transmission, 130 
given unobserved and not parameterised amount of viral shedding.  Thus, TP was individually 131 
assigned to agents according to a probabilistic distribution, constrained to range 1-100%, with a pre-132 
specified population mean and assumption of normality around the mean.  TP values are highly 133 
influential in the model and easily alter the basic reproduction number (r0).  Stage 1 is the phase of 134 
our modelling where we use multiple iterations to establish the mean population TP value that most 135 
reliably led to the target r0 (1.9).  The stage 1 model tests candidate mean TP values from 70-90% (in 136 
increments of 0.1-1%; standard deviation = mean/4.  Potential changes in take-precautions (TP), due 137 
to circulating advice, is the key behaviour response in our stage 2-3 models, as described in 138 
subsequent sections where individual TP values vary in response to circulating advice. 139 
Infection was transmitted when infectious agents encounter susceptible agents and neither 140 
took adequate precautions to avoid transmission (tested stochastically and hourly).  Incubation and 141 
illness durations were determined stochastically (with mean = 36 hours). Recovered individuals were 142 
immune.  Many features that could more ideally replicate norovirus outbreaks were not included, 143 
such as shedding of virus post-illness, increased transmission due to closer night-time contact, 144 
environmental and foodborne transmission.  These were omitted to reduce model complexity and 145 
instead focus on the impacts of information spread. 146 
Any TP value ever set to < 0 was reset to 0 while values > 1 became 1.  The model ran until 147 
no one was incubating or infectious. 148 
 149 
 150 
  151 
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2.3 Stage 2. Incorporating Information spread and how that could change behaviour during an 152 
epidemic 153 
Advice is information that may be true or false by objective standards.  Good advice, if 154 
believed, encourages taking precautions that will be effective.  Bad advice in our models is 155 
information that promotes not taking effective precautions or other behaviour that increases risk of 156 
transmission.  Misinformation online is typically much more exciting than true information [22]  157 
False stories are observed to be more surprising and novel than true stories, and more likely to have 158 
counter-hegemonic framing [23].  We therefore assume that bad advice elicits stronger emotions, 159 
and often challenges orthodox or ‘mainstream’ sources.  These attributes make bad advice attractive 160 
and thus often shared with others.  Believing bad advice could mean increased physical contact, 161 
more intimate types of contact, less hand-washing, less disinfection, sharing food or touching 162 
contaminated fomites: effectively, taking fewer precautions to avoid disease.  163 
Our stage 2-3 models assume that taking-precautions (TP) changed in response to each 164 
exposure to bad or good advice.  No existing data suggested the magnitude of change after each 165 
information exposure.  It was most useful to find a TP change that consistently led to a worse 166 
outbreak (we defined “worse” = 40% increase in r0, from 1.9 to 2.66).  Therefore, we repeatedly 167 
tested many change values to find one that most consistently led to r0 = 2.66 (see “Finishing stage 2” 168 
below). 169 
How the take-precautions attribute changed in response to advice depended on trust in 170 
information sources. 171 
 172 
 173 
2.4 (Dis)Trust in The Establishment 174 
Distrust in conventional authorities is closely linked to tendency to believe in conspiracy 175 
theories (CTs) [24].  The best predictor of belief in a specific CT or domain of CTs is pre-existing belief 176 
in a CT [25, 26]. CTs are relevant to believing bad advice, because fake news stories often use 177 
conspiracy theories to allege that conventional advice or conflicting information should be 178 
disregarded.   CTs are also incorporated into fake news to increase circulation [23, 27, 28]. 179 
Predisposition to distrust establishment sources exists within our model as a stochastic 180 
property assigned individually to each agent called reject-est (“reject establishment”).  Reject-est 181 
ranges from 0 to 1.  Reject-est affects likelihood of sharing information as well as predisposition to 182 
change behaviour in response to bad advice (assumed to be both more emotionally framed and 183 
contextualised with counter-hegemonic bias, making the information more attractive to those with a 184 
high reject-est bias).185 
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Table 1.  Key agent-own parameters  187 
Variable or feature Purpose Where used in model(s) Allowed range Plausible or likely 
values 
Other info or 
assumptions 
members-my-bubble List of agents that 
comprise each 
person’s information 
“filter bubble” [26] 
 
Who advice is shared with chosen from this 
bubble. 
 
Size = approx. 
80-230, to 
conform with 
Dunbar# 
expectations, 
mean ~150 
See Dunbar# 
research [29]  
Item S2  explains in 
more how bubble 
membership was 
constructed.  
recovery-time: 
 
Indicate duration of 
infectiousness and 
illness (assumed to 
perfectly coincide) 
 
To decide transition from infectious to recovered 
status. 
1 to 2x mean = 
36 hrs; 1 hr min.  
24-72h [9] 
 
36h treated as 
population mean  
reject-est: 
 
tendency to believe fake 
news and reject 
“establishment” 
(conventional) messages 
(%/100) how much 
they tend to believe 
bad advice.  
Used for likelihood of sharing types of 
information and predisposition to changing 
behaviour, always considered in comparison to 
mean group reject-est value.  Relates to 
var=take-precautions, and how much agents are 
influenced by types of advice.   
0-1; higher 
means accept BA 
more easily 
38.88% is 
supported by the 
literature. 
Does not change during 
outbreak 
take-precautions              
(TP) 
 
 
Likelihood of taking 
precautions to prevent 
getting disease 
Set at start from distribution with mean = 79.6%, 
SD = 19.23%; which consistently yielded target r0 
= 1.9.  TP indicates the % of contact moments 
when agents take effective precautions  
0-1 
 
Scaled 0-100% TP changes during 
outbreak, in response 
to advice exposed to 
(stages 2-3) 
time-to-incubate To indicate when agent 
changes from 
incubating to 
infectious 
Allows for lag between exposure and illness; 
when agents can travel further so potentially be 
nearer more naïve population when infectious 
period starts. 
1+ Median and mean 
both around 36 
hrs 
Random-normal 
distribution around 
population mean (36 h) 
 188 
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  An estimated 50% of Americans [30] endorse at least one health-linked conspiracy theory  189 
Up to 44% of populace in diverse countries believe the demonstrable falsehood that vaccines cause 190 
autism [31].  Such beliefs have exacerbated real life disease outbreaks and risk-taking behaviour [32, 191 
33].  Reported prevalence of beliefs in specific health myths (with health protection implications) 192 
linked to specific conspiracy theories among British and Americans ranges from 9% to 37% [30, 34].  193 
The tendencies to believe CTs or poor quality information are distinct personal qualities [35], but 194 
empirical [23, 33, 36-38] and theoretical [38-41] evidence suggests extremely similar ideological and 195 
psychological processes underpin tendencies to believe both CTs and fake news.  For model 196 
purposes, we assumed that predisposition to believe in CTs could serve as proxy for our posited 197 
reject-est attribute.  Each individual’s reject-est attribute did not change during the outbreak. 198 
Published data [25] suggest that on average, British adults believed in 38.88% of CTs (SD 199 
0.15, normal distribution around the mean).  Therefore, reject-est values were assigned to agents 200 
such that the population mean = 38.88% (SD= 15%), constrained to range from 0 to 100% inclusive.  201 
Importantly, small groups (n=25) agents were distributed semi-randomly in the agent world such 202 
that they were physically clustered near others with similar reject-est values, and those individuals 203 
were also mutual members of each agent’s information bubble (see below and additional item S2).  204 
 205 
2.5 Information Bubbles 206 
The phenomena that people choose how and from whom they receive information has been 207 
termed “filter bubbles” [26].  These bubbles work to discourage alternative viewpoints.    For each 208 
agent, we generated a unique list of contacts in their bubble. The contact list included all agents 209 
within six spatial steps; because of deliberate placement earlier, many of these near-by individuals 210 
had similar reject-est values (assigned within the same octile of reject-est values).  To this bubble 211 
were added approximately 120 agents anywhere in the agent-world, in a ratio about 2:1 similar:not 212 
similar reject-est octiles..  The target was to achieve final bubbles with a mean 150 members (range 213 
80-230) to conform with Dunbar numbers, which estimate the number of persons with whom we 214 
each have significant (to us) relationships [29].  To reflect real world filter bubbles and social 215 
networks, ours should have variable reciprocity [42-45]  and homophily levels [46], but veering 216 
towards demonstrating more rather than less reciprocity and homophily.  Homophily is important in 217 
real health behaviour; individuals respond more to health promotion interventions when they come 218 
from a person or network of similar-to-recipient persons [47, 48]  219 
Distributions of reject-est values, homophily and reciprocity were checked to confirm that 220 
the bubbles achieved desired attributes.   221 
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Membership of one’s information bubble did not change during the simulated outbreak.  222 
Information sharing was independently decided from opportunities for physical contact.  Real world 223 
sharing equivalents are telephone calls, sharing on social media, sending texts or emails, 224 
conversations, etc. 225 
 226 
2.6 Advice spread 227 
Two simultaneous processes happen during each model time-step.  Agents move in a 228 
random direction, potentially transmit disease, incubate, are ill or recover.  At the same time, pieces 229 
of advice are introduced (or “injected”) into the community.  Each injected piece of advice is 230 
exposed to just one agent.  Injected advice has a 50:50 chance of being good/bad in the (no-231 
intervention) stage 2 modelling.  This individual responds to the information, as well as chooses 232 
whether to share it (decided stochastically).   If advice was shared, the exposed individual made a 233 
separate and independent decision whether to share it again to others, creating an information 234 
cascade that continued until exhausted.  Each sequence of information sharing started and 235 
completed within a single time step (one hour).   236 
 237 
2.7 Predisposition to share advice 238 
Our model rules for advice–sharing were designed to make the rumour distribution patterns 239 
resemble observations in Vosoughi et al [22] (about Twitter cascades).   A cascade is a series of 240 
tweets with a single origin; cascade length is the maximum number of retweets passing thru only 241 
unique tweeters.   The default likelihood of sharing good advice was set to 3%, because only about 242 
3% of cascades were both >1 tweet long and demonstrably true stories.  Vosoughi et al. reported 243 
several other cascade properties that were used as model targets: that the maximum depth for any 244 
true story was 9; (vs. 19 for false stories); 85% of cascades had depth = 1 (only tweeted once and not 245 
retweeted at all); 2% had depth > 5.  Bots retweeted equal numbers of true and false stories, but 246 
humans overwhelmingly favoured retweeting false stories.  Other research had similar observations 247 
as Vosoughi et al. about cascade depths and likelihood of sharing on Twitter [49-52]. 248 
Only about 15% of Twitter stories were shared.  Of the information shared on Twitter, 80% 249 
was untrue stories (false rumours were four times more likely to be shared than true stories).  We 250 
assumed that sharing of false stories is more likely among those with a counter hegemonic bias = 251 
agents with a high reject-est value.  The likelihood of sharing bad advice (“willshare” variable) was 252 
calculated in stage 2-3 models for individual agents using Eq.1 which was found empirically to yield 253 
desirable cascade properties: 254 
 255 
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(Eq1)                willshare  =  (3% * 4) * ( reject-est / (mean [global reject-est of all agents] )  256 
 257 
Eq.1 causes the likelihood of sharing bad advice to be inflated from (default when good advice) 3% 258 
to 12%, and then further adjusted by the agent’s reject-est value relative to the population mean 259 
reject-est. The net effect was a model assumption that agents with relatively higher reject-est values 260 
(more likely to believe in conspiracy theories) were more likely to share bad advice stories.   Most 261 
real people don’t repeatedly share the same information (good or bad).  We applied the next 262 
formula to reset the willshare propensity after each share: 263 
 264 
(Eq2)           willshare = willshare / ( 4 ^ [number of times already-shared this advice] ) 265 
 266 
Equations 1-2 are not meant to be definitive for social network behaviour.  We determined these 267 
equations empirically and use them because they consistently led to cascade sharing patterns that 268 
agreed reasonably well with real observations in Vosoughi, Roy [22] 269 
The model represents sharing by any means, including spoken conversation, phone calls, 270 
texts, social media, online forum postings, etc.  When an agent shares advice, they only reach a very 271 
small fraction of people in their bubble (2.5%), which percentage made the cascade patterns behave 272 
reasonably well with regard to our targets for depth and onward sharing.  Sharing behaviour was 273 
also simplified such that all shares for each cascade finished within each model time step (1 unit = 1 274 
hour).  Most real Twitter cascades stop growing within 2 hours of initiation  [51]. 275 
 276 
2.8 Daily injections (introductions) of relevant discussions or stories 277 
We used data on real number of daily conversations [53], and search frequency about health 278 
matters [54, 55] to estimate how many relevant information injections should happen in the model 279 
(10.4 per hour); more details how this was estimated are in Additional Item S1.  We ran multiple 280 
simulations to find an injection rate (of advice) that led to the desired target of 10.4 cascades/hour 281 
(or 166 per day, based on 16 waking hours).   282 
 283 
2.9 Finishing Stage 2: Bad advice making an outbreak worse 284 
Changes in taking precautions we denote as ΔTP (absolute change in percentage of the time 285 
that precautions were taken, in response to each piece of advice an agent is exposed to).    One 286 
aspect of ΔTP is partly evidenced from prior studies, given an assumption that bad advice is usually 287 
framed more emotionally.  People change their statements about intended behaviour in response to 288 
exposure to information; they change behaviour more after frequent exposure [32, 56, 57].  289 
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However, at least in laboratory settings, the magnitude of change-in-intentions does not depend on 290 
whether material is emotively framed  [58-62].  Therefore, our model assumes that ΔTP is the same 291 
whether advice is good or bad.   292 
The final stage 2 model needed to achieve a net increase of 40% in the r0 in response to 293 
circulating information (from 1.9 to 2.66).  Although ΔTP was the same fixed value in stage 2 models 294 
(whether good or bad advice), because more bad than good advice circulates (4:1 ratio), any ΔTP 295 
above zero increases r0 and tends to change other metrics such as attack rate and peak prevalence. 296 
Therefore we tested multiple values of ΔTP over the range .01 to 0.22 (1-100 iterations) to find a 297 
value of ΔTP that consistently produced the target r0 (2.66).  We then compared the average 298 
outputs from the stage 2 model (50+ iterations) with results when intervention strategies were 299 
applied to try to reduce the impact of bad advice on the outbreak (stage 3). 300 
 301 
2.10 Stage 3: Intervention Strategies 302 
Proposed strategies to fight fake news include:  303 
 304 
1) Provide counter-information that is equally or better evidenced, or more persuasive [2, 26, 305 
63-66] 306 
2) Tax the advertising or tax the profits of products sold via misinformation [67] 307 
3) Drown bad info with good information [67] 308 
4) Regulate information [26], possibly impose civil or criminal liabilities [2] which could lead to 309 
explicit censorship [2, 26] 310 
5) Revise financial models available to fake news disseminators (incentives) to stop 311 
encouraging production and sharing of false (or even just very salaciously written) stories 312 
over truth and accuracy [3, 22, 28, 66] 313 
6) Labelling (reliability rating or counter-arguments provided) by news provider [2, 22, 26, 66]  314 
7) Encourage individuals to actively strive to make their own filter bubbles more diverse [26] 315 
8) ‘Immunise’, recipients to disregard fake news (education-based strategy) [68] 316 
 317 
We don’t model effects of intervention strategy 1 because the results are predictable; eg., good 318 
advice as contagious as bad advice is what happens in our stage 1 scenario (no net changes would 319 
result), and otherwise any changes will be linear responses if good advice increases without a 320 
reduction in bad advice.  Pragmatically, we reduced strategies 2-8 to two basic interventions in stage 321 
3 models, as described below.  One hundred runs were tried for each intervention (tested separately 322 
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rather than together), and the mean effects were reported and compared with each other and stage 323 
1-2 outcomes.  Stage 3 models were run under stage 2 conditions but with the below modifications: 324 
 325 
• Reduce bad advice injections from 50% to 30% or 10% of total information exposures, to 326 
simulate tax disincentives, regulation, labelling or “drowning” strategies 327 
• “Immunise” against bad information (but not against the virus, while able to react 328 
positively to good advice): a fixed percentage of randomly selected agents (30% or 90%) 329 
who never respond to or share bad advice, to simulate education-based or bubble-330 
diversity strategies. 331 
 332 
3. RESULTS 333 
3.1 Model performance and optimisation exercises 334 
With regard to information bubble construction, additional item S2 shows the spread of 335 
reject-est values, and that bubbles had high homophily and high reciprocity; bubble sizes also met 336 
Dunbar number targets.  More details about the following results are in additional item S3.  To 337 
achieve target r0 = 1.9, the optimal initialised mean take-precautions attribute for the models was 338 
76.9%.  At stage 2, we found that 138 advice injections per hour produced the target 166 339 
conversations/day.  This meant (over 20 iterations) that 70.7% of cascades had length = 1 (vs. target 340 
85%) and about 1.83% of cascades had length ≥ 5 (vs. target 1.96%).  We judged that the cascade 341 
results were acceptably close to targets.  The stage 2 optimised ΔTP value was 0.026 (see model 342 
iterations in Item S3), which made r0 consistently rise from 1.9 to 2.66 in response to advice 343 
exposure. 344 
 345 
 346 
3.2 Intervention strategies 347 
Table 2 shows key outbreak indicators for the stage 1 model (no change in TP due to 348 
information spread) the final stage 2 model (with rate of advice injections = 138/hour and ΔTP = 349 
0.026), and stage 3 models (what happens due to specific intervention strategies).   350 
In Table 2, stage 2 is effectively a baseline to describe an outbreak exacerbated by 351 
circulating bad advice.  Reducing the circulating bad advice from 50% to 30% of all introduced 352 
information, created a scenario that is much better than the stage 1 model, when circulating advice 353 
had no effect on average behaviour.  Even if bad advice was reduced to 10% of total circulating 354 
information, the model still suggested that > 40% of individuals would get ill before the outbreak 355 
was finished. 356 
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‘Immunising’ 30% or more individuals (chosen at random, from any community bubble) 357 
tended to create an outbreak profile similar to or no worse than stage 1 (no influence of circulating 358 
information).  This still meant almost 80% final attack rate and a peak prevalence near 24%.  An 359 
immunisation rate of 90% produced r0 values around 1.38, with final attack rates over 50% and peak 360 
prevalence around 18%. 361 
 362 
Additional item S3 shows a larger range of model assumptions and inputs than reported in Table 2, 363 
with respect to either altering the information balance or immunisation strategies. There was a clear 364 
trend towards more desirable outbreak measures (lower r0, lower final attack rate, lower peak 365 
prevalence) with less bad advice or higher immunisation rates.  366 
 367 
 368 
4. DISCUSSION 369 
With regard to reducing the amount of bad advice in circulation (whether by labelling poor 370 
quality info, drowning with better quality advice, regulation or financial disincentives), a reduction 371 
from 50% to 30% of total information exposures seems a large decrease but it may be feasible.  372 
Setting the ratio of good to bad advice to 70:30 more than negated the deleterious effects of 373 
circulating bad advice in our model. Even if 90% of the advice is good, however, some disease will 374 
still circulate (r0 stays above 1.0) because the baseline level of taking effective precautions is 375 
assumed to be imperfect (ie., well below 100%). 376 
We were also interested in the ‘herd immunity’ levels required to ‘immunise’ people against 377 
fake news, and thus negate the influence of circulating bad advice on a hypothetical outbreak.  The 378 
modelling suggests that any ‘immunity’ against bad advice reduces outbreak impacts.  Herd 379 
immunity of at least 30% returned the outbreak to no worse than the stage 1 model scenario (ie, 380 
when circulating information has no impact).   381 
Four previous studies used ABM to describe a norovirus outbreak [69-72], only one of which 382 
also incorporated information spread [69].  In other modelling, information spread led to increased 383 
awareness and greater protection against disease [73-82].   384 
Similar to our study, some models [81-83] had behaviour outcomes comprised of multiple 385 
precautionary behaviours.  Our clustering agent  locations with respect to attitude towards trusting 386 
authority sources was novel, however.  Considering how institutional distrust might change 387 
behaviour is also unusual in previous research [84].   388 
 389 
 390 
 391 
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Table 2. Stage 1 (no sharing), stage 2 (outbreak exacerbated by bad advice), and stage 3 (results using intervention strategies).  Mean values for given 
outbreak characteristics, with 5-95th percentiles to indicate range without the most extreme values. 
 
 
r0 Duration (days) Final Attack Rate 
Prevalence of 
illness at peak 
# of 
iterations 
Stage 1  
No circulating advice  1.90 20.1 78.9% 23.5% 
 
100 
5-95th percentile range 1.80-1.99 15.2-25.9 76.0-81.4% 18.6-28.8%  
      
Stage 2. Circulating advice makes outbreak worse, r0 increase by 40%    
Good:Bad advice ratio is 50:50 
5-95th percentile range 
2.66 
2.50-2.89 
19.0 
15.1-25.1 
91.8% 
90.3-93.8% 
29.1% 
24.6-34.7% 
 
100 
    
Stage 3 models. strategies to reduce impacts of circulating bad advice in Stage 2 conditions  
Good:Bad advice ratio is 70:30 
5-95th percentile range 
1.67 
1.53-1.78 
19.7 
15.4-26.3 
70.4% 
63.6-75.5% 
21.2% 
14.8-27.1% 
100 
 
Good:Bad advice ratio is 90:10 
         5-95th percentile range 
 
1.22 
1.14-1.31 
14.1 
11.9-17.1 
41.5% 
31.8-50.2% 
14.9% 
10.1-19.8% 
 
100 
 
30% of agents are ‘immunised’ 
5-95th percentile range 
1.91 
1.82-2.01 
20.2 
14.1-31.2 
79.0% 
76.2-81.7% 
23.8% 
18.2-28.7% 
 
100 
 
90% of agents are ‘immunised’ 
5-95th percentile range 
1.38 
1.26-1.49 
17.1 
13.1-21.6 
53.8% 
43.5-62.5% 
17.6% 
11.0-23.3% 
 
100 
 
Note: ‘immunised’ means immunity against believing or sharing bad advice, rather than immunity against norovirus.
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4.1 Limitations 
Limitations that prevent our results being fully generalizable to the real world are too many 
to fully list, we only try to consider the most important and feasible areas for improvement.  The 
model was only tested for norovirus.  Better data about true precautionary behaviour and behaviour 
change are the parameters that would most improve the reliability of our model outputs.  Bayesian 
responses might also better reflect real world behaviour changes, too. 
This model inherently considers the case of Bad Advice, presumed to be bundled with 
counter-hegemonic bias in contrast to Good Advice that is delivered with implied authority of 
endorsement from conventional sources.   Bad advice that circulates for other reasons (well-
meaning or dully presented but still incorrect) or good advice presented to be as exciting and 
‘contagious’ as fake news [65] -- these are not included. Their omissions should only matter if the 
missing types of advice were thought to significantly modify the impacts of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ advice 
as described here. 
The model also assumes that advice cascades terminate within a single hour; real 
information may spread over much longer time periods [22].  No agent is treated as more influential 
than others; there is inconclusive evidence about the importance of “influencers” in social networks 
[49, 65].   
The model considers community, non-institutional settings (so not hospitals or parties or 
other high-density settings).    No physical travel by new agents or existing agents to outside the 
system is considered. No adjustment was made for secretor status or innate immunity [85].  The 
models have a simplistic perspective on aspects of message framing.  Framing and contextual 
presentation can be much more nuanced [86] in how they impact behaviour and beliefs.  The only 
transmission pathway considered is person-to-person.  In reality, many norovirus cases are 
contracted via fomites or food [87].  The model ignores the possibility of shedding before or after 
illness, which strongly raises r0 in norovirus outbreaks [85, 88].  There was no accounting for 
variations in immune response or age; infants and children are often more susceptible and have 
longer shedding periods. [85, 88].  We omitted foodborne, environmental or outside-illness shedding 
transmission pathways because they would have added extra complexity without adding extra 
clarity about how information sharing could affect outbreak development.  
Agents ‘immunised’ against bad advice were randomly placed among the population, 
regardless of their reject-est attribute or local community traits; this is too simplistic and not 
realistic.  Perhaps a ‘vaccination’ strategy analogous to ring vaccination or otherwise targeting 
demographic groups most likely to be susceptible to fake news would be more appropriate, when 
trying to ‘immunise’ people against fake news. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
In our modelling, changing the ratio of good to bad advice (from 50:50 to 70:30) or at least 
30% of people immunised to resist misinformation were both adequate thresholds to counteract 
negative impacts from fake news spreading during a norovirus outbreak.   Changing the ratio of 
good:bad advice to 90:10 or immunising 90% of the population against misinformation was still not 
adequate to completely resist the impacts of circulating bad advice.  How feasible it is to achieve 
these types of targets within communication networks or among community populations should be 
explored, with regard to cost-benefits and practical implementation. 
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